Abstract. There are many remote user authentication schemes proposed in literature for preventing unauthorized parties from accessing resources in an insecure environment. Due to inherent tamper-resistance, most of them are based on smart card authentication schemes. Unfortunately, the cost of cards and readers makes these schemes costly. In the real world, common storage devices, such as universal serial bus (USB) thumb drives, portable HDDs, mobile phones, Laptop or Desktop PCs, are widely used, and they are much cheaper or more convenient for storing user authentication information. However, since these devices do not provide tamper-resistance, it is a challenge to design a secure authentication scheme using these kinds of memory devices. In this paper, we will propose a secure passwordbased remote user authentication and key agreement scheme without using smart cards. According to our analysis, the proposed scheme guarantees mutual authentication and also resists off-line dictionary, replay, forgery, and impersonation attacks. Compared to related scheme, the proposed scheme's computation cost is lower and the total message length is shorter. Therefore, our scheme is suitable even for applications in limited power computing environments.
Introduction
With the increasing number of systems that provide services over open networks, remote authentication is critical for preventing unauthorized parties from accessing remote system resources. Smart cards are the most commonly used mechanism in password-based remote user authentication schemes. Smart card-based authentication schemes [5] provide strong authentication and reduce the risk of server side verification tables being tampered with using Lamport's authentication scheme [9] . In order to improve security and efficiency, many authentication schemes have been proposed [1, 4-7, 10-11, 14-15, 17-18] in the last decade.
Smart cards are usually adopted to store the personal secret information such as authentication information. Though smart card-based authentication schemes come with a tamper-resistant property, when a smart card is lost, the card holder needs to worry about the damage arising from the loss of the smart card. Especially since there is research showing smart card content being extracted by off-line passive power analysis [8] . Using tamper-resistant devices does not guarantee that an authentication scheme is secure against all risks. In addition, the cost of the necessary KWWSG[GRLRUJMLWF infrastructure for smart card-based schemes, such as the cards and readers add substantially to the cost. In the real world, common storage devices, such as USB thumb drives, portable HDDs, mobile phones, and Laptop or Desktop PCs, are much cheaper or more convenient for storing user authentication information issued from the system server. However, since these common storage devices come without tamperresistance, it is a big challenge to design a secure authentication scheme using these memory devices.
In 2009, Rhee et al. [12] analyzed the security of two remote authentication schemes proposed by Fan et al. [4] and Khan and Zhang [7] , respectively. Rhee et al. showed that the two schemes are vulnerable to impersonation attacks when the tamper-resistant property is eliminated from smart-card-based schemes; in other words, if any user in those two schemes is using insecure storage instead of using a tamperresistant device such as a smart card, the user authentication procedure is insecure against impersonation attacks. In order to mitigate this weakness and enhance security when using insecure storage device, Rhee et al. proposed a remote user authentication scheme (RKL-scheme for short) based on ElGamal's public key cryptosystem [3] . They stated that their scheme provides mutual authentication with no verification table at the cost of only two messages for login and authentication protocols. They also claimed that their scheme is resistant against impersonation and off-line dictionary attacks. However, Tan [16] performed a security analysis of RKL-scheme later in 2009 and pointed out that the RKL-scheme is insecure against impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks.
So RKL-scheme is insecure because we find that there are much redundant information and they lack identification-related information in terms of their login request. In this paper, we will propose a novel secure password-based remote user authentication and key agreement scheme using common storage devices such as USB drives. The proposed scheme is based on the difficulty of cracking the computational DiffieHellman Problem (CDHP for short) [2, 13] . According to our security analysis, the proposed scheme cannot only withstand off-line dictionary and well-known online attacks, but also provides mutual authentication. Compared with the RKL-scheme, the proposed scheme's computation cost is lower and the total message length is also shorter. Therefore, our scheme is efficient and more suitable for applications in power-limited computing environments.
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the preliminaries. In Section 3, we propose our secure password-based remote user authentication and key agreement scheme without using smart cards, and present the security analysis of the proposed scheme in Section 4. Our conclusions are given in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Notations
The notations used throughout this paper are as follows.
server S's secret key x p, q two large prime numbers that satisfy p=2q+1 x H secure one-way hash function x T timestamp x ǻT maximum transmission delay x Z q ring of integers modulo q x Z q * multiplicative group of Z q x ‫צ‬ concatenation operation
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) [2, 13]
Consider a multiplicative group G and an element g G having order p. The CDH problem states that, given g a mod p and g b mod p for randomly-chosen a, b, it is computationally intractable to compute the value g ab mod p. Note that this problem is closely related to the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm problem (DLP for short) over a cyclic group.
Security of Common Storage Devices
USB drives are ease to use memory devices. There are commercially available products coming with fingerprint locks or protected by AES-256 encryption. We incorporate these kinds of products in our scheme to strengthen the tamper-resistant property. Checking fingerprints provides a better security on unauthorized access. Encrypting files also provides considerable protection against tamper attacks or stolen items.
Goals
(I) The proposed scheme should provide a mechanism to prevent data tampering even though the scheme comes without using tamper-resistant devices. (II) The proposed scheme should protect stored data against off-line dictionary attack. (III) The proposed scheme should withstand wellknown on-line attacks, such as replay attack, forgery attack, and user/server impersonation attack.
Proposed Scheme
We propose our novel secure password-based remote user authentication and key agreement scheme without using smart cards in this section, as shown in Figure1. The proposed scheme consists of three phases: registration, login, and authentication, and one activity: password change.
Registration Phase
In this phase, server S selects large prime numbers p and q that satisfy p = 2q + 1, its secret key x Z q *, and a one-way hash function H. User U i applies his identity ID i and password PW i to S, obtains the authentication information from S and stores the information on his local memory device.
Step R1. U i chooses his identity ID i and password PW i and sends them to S via a secure channel.
Step R2. Upon receiving the registration information, S computes
Step R3. S sends the authentication information {Y i , H, p, q} back to U i via the secure channel.
Step R4. Upon receiving the authentication information, U i stores it locally on his memory device, i.e., his USB drive. 
Login Phase
This phase is invoked whenever user U i wants to access system resources provided by server S. To log into the system, U i retrieves the authentication information stored on his USB stick, calculates the proper information, and submits his login request to S. In our scheme, the authentication information issued from the server is stored on a device without tamperresistance. It is possible that the information may be altered by careless or malicious means. In such case, to ensure the correctness of the authentication information, we setup a timeout threshold; any user must go back to the registration phase and re-obtain his authentication information if he does not receive the server's reply after the threshold time.
Step L1. U i chooses a random numbers D Z q * and computes
Step L3. If U i does not receive S's reply before timeout, U i must go back to the registration phase and re-obtain his authentication information.
Authentication Phase
Upon receiving the login request from user U i , server S checks the request and replies the mutual authentication message if U i is legitimate. After mutual authentication completed, U i and S establish a secure channel by their shared session key sk.
Step A1. S checks that ID i is valid and (T 2 í T 1 ) < ǻT, where T 2 is the time which ID i arrives to the server S. If either does not hold, S drops the request and terminates the session. 
Password Change Activity
In the case where user U i wants to change his identity ID i and password PW i , he can choose his new identity ID i * and password PW i *, go back to the registration phase, and re-obtain his new authentication information from server S.
Security and Performance Analysis
In this section, we present the security analysis of the proposed scheme.
Security of Server S's Secret Key {x}
In the proposed scheme, only the service providing server S knows the secret key x. x mod p, he needs to break the difficult problem of DLP [2] . Currently, it is believed that there is no polynomial time algorithm that can solve DLP. 
Security of User
Off-line Dictionary Attacks
Assume that U i 's authentication information {Y i , H, p, q} is stolen by an adversary A, and A has also eavesdropped U i 's communication flows {ID i , C i , V i , T 1 } and {M i , T 3 }. By the discussion in Section 4.1 of the security of S's secret {x}, we prove that it is very difficult that A can successfully recover the server's secret key x from the user's authentication information or eavesdropped communication flows. According to the security of U i 's password {PW i } discussed in Section 4.2, it is no way that A can retrieve the user's password PW i from user's authentication information or eavesdropped communication flows. Also, from the discussion in Section 4.3, we see that it is impossible that A can successfully retrieve U i 's secret information Y i ' from Y i . Therefore, our scheme is secure against off-line dictionary attacks.
On-line Attacks
We analyze the security of our scheme when it is attacking by: replay, forgery, and user/server impersonation attacks.
Replay Attacks
Assume that an adversary A pretends to be user U i or server S by replaying the eavesdropped communication flows, such as U i 's login request
can easily detect a replay attack by checking the timestamp T 1 . For S's response {M i , T 3 }, U i can easily detect a replay attack by checking the timestamp T 3 . Therefore, the attacker cannot circumvent the timestamp checking and complete the authentication phase. Note that, the manin-the middle attack is a particular case of replay attack. It can also be detected by checking the timestamp.
Forgery Attacks
An adversary A may try to modify T 1 in Step L2 or T 3 in Step A4 to achieve a forgery attack. This will not work unless he also modifies
Step A3 with their corresponding values. However, it is difficult to compute the two digests V i and M i correctly without user U i 's password PW i or server S's secret key x. Unless A can compute the two digests V i or M i , both S and U i can easily calculate the corresponding hash value and compare with the received V i or M i , respectively.
User Impersonation Attacks
If an adversary A wants to forge the login request {ID i , C i , V i , T 1 } and impersonate user U i to fool server S, A needs to compute Y i ' = H(ID i )
x mod p. However, from the previous discussion in Section 4.3, A cannot calculate the correct values of D i and V i without Y i '. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against user impersonation attacks.
Server Impersonation Attacks
Assume that there is an adversary A that intends to masquerade as server S and deceive user U i . A needs to generate a valid response {M i , T 3 }, where
. However, from the discussion in Section 4.1, we proved that A cannot recover the server's secret key x from the eavesdropped communication flows and authentication information. Therefore, A cannot correctly compute D i ' and generate the forged mutual authentication message without x. Hence, the proposed scheme is secure against server impersonation attacks.
Mutual Authentication
The proposed scheme provides a mechanism that allows the user and server to verify each other. From the discussion in Section 4.2, we can recognize that only the legitimate user with the correct password can pass through the server's verification. In addition, from the discussion in Section 4.1, we also can distinguish that only the correct server with correct secret key can be qualified by the user. Therefore, the scheme achieves mutual authentication between a valid user and the server.
Secure Channel
After mutual authentication completed, both U i and S can calculate their symmetric session key sk and establish a secure channel for subsequent communications. Note that if current session key is compromised by an attacker, the secrecy of previously established session keys is not affected. In the proposed scheme, the session key
Even if the system session key x is compromised, the attacker cannot calculate any previous sk without the random value D chosen every login session by U i .
Efficiency
We evaluated the performance of the proposed scheme with related schemes. Tables 1 and 2 show the computation overhead and communication cost of RKL-scheme [12] and the proposed scheme. From Table 1 , we can calculate the total computation overhead of RKL-scheme and ours to be 8t e + 4t m + 6t h and 4t e + 3t m + 6t h , respectively. It can be seen that the proposed scheme can save four exponentiation and one multiplication operations compared to RKL-scheme.
From Table 2 , the communication costs of RKLscheme and the proposed scheme are 8 terms and 6 terms. We can reasonably assume that the lengths of the identity and the timestamp are 64 bits, the length of the prime number p is 128 bits, and the one-way hash function is SHA-1 with 160 bits throughout. The communication cost at the user side between RKLscheme and the proposed scheme is 640(=64+128+128+128+128+64) bits and 416(=64+128+160+64) bits, respectively. It is demonstrated that the proposed scheme's communication cost is shorter than RKL-scheme's. According to our analysis on both computation overhead and communication cost, our scheme is efficient and more suitable for applications in powerlimited computing environments.
Functionality
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a novel secure password-based remote user authentication scheme which solves the user impersonation attack problem by adding a blind factor into the authentication information stored on a user's local memory device. The proposed scheme is based on the difficulty of cracking CDHP. We demonstrated that the proposed scheme cannot only withstand off-line dictionary and well-known on-line attacks, but also provides mutual authentication. It shows that the proposed scheme achieves our goals. In other words, the proposed scheme retains all the advantages of RKL-scheme while being robust against user/server impersonation attacks, and also provides more security properties at the same time. Compared with RKL-scheme, the proposed scheme's computation cost is lower and the message length is shorter. Therefore, our scheme is efficient and more suitable for applications in powerlimited computing environments.
